【英语财经】中国影子银行不足为惧 Guest Post: illuminating China’s financial shadows

  • 【英语财经】中国影子银行不足为惧 Guest Post: illuminating China’s financial shadows已关闭评论
  • 21 views
  • A+
所属分类:双语财经

2014-6-12 06:43

小艾摘要: Dangerous things can lurk in the shadows of a financial system. We know this because when the US banking system almost burnt down in 2008, the stuff in the shadows was the fire’s accelerant. The high ...
Guest Post: illuminating China’s financial shadows
Dangerous things can lurk in the shadows of a financial system. We know this because when the US banking system almost burnt down in 2008, the stuff in the shadows was the fire’s accelerant. The highly-leveraged, off-balance sheet vehicles loaded with securitised debt meant made the banking crisis were far worse than it would have otherwise been.

Knowing the problems that lurked in the US, the idea of shadow banking in China freaks people out. The sector seems to have grown fast, in an economy already known for its tendency for asset bubbles and bad lending. We have spent time poking around in the shadows. We believe that much of the fear is misplaced.

China’s so-called shadow banking has little to do with what happened in the US. At its broadest, shadow banking is credit extended by non-bank financial institutions. That goes on in China – via, most importantly, wealth management products. These are sold by trust companies and banks as a form of asset management. The trusts manage some Rmb10tn (US$1.6tn) for rich individuals and firms, and the banks’ WMP officially are of a similar scale (though some Rmb3tn of trust AUM is bank WMP money).

The sector has its roots in reaction to regulation. Banks, facing stricter capital requirements as Basel III has been introduced, have looked to develop off-balance sheet business. And households are keen to move funds stuck in traditional deposit accounts to WMPs since the yield pick-up is significant. For the banks, the majority of WMP funds are managed off-balance sheet.

There are clearly some problems here. Holding WMP funds off the balance sheet allows the banks to avoid some important regulatory ratios – capital is not held against investments, for instance. If a WMP product goes bad, in theory the investor bares the loss but in practice the bank usually makes the client whole.

But many of the risks that grip the popular imagination are ill-founded. Moreover, there are important differences between the WMPs the bank sell and the wealth products sold by the trust companies.

First of all, when we looked through a typical bank’s WMP portfolio, we found that most of the funds are used to buy short-term, liquid interbank deposits. As a result, the average WMP yield tracks interbank yields. So, the idea that all these funds are being poured into residential developments in China’s ‘ghost cities’ is wrong. Only 20-30 per cent of bank WMP funds are being lent out.

In contrast, trust company funds are almost entirely being lent out, and our research suggests that most of those funds are going to real estate and local government infrastructure companies. There are much more credit risks here.

Second, when the banks lent out WMP funds, the borrowers usually go through the exact same credit approval process as they would as if they were borrowing on balance sheet funds. The quality of trust companies’ credit process varies hugely. Moreover, while banks have large balance sheets to back any losses, trusts have thin layers of capital, and so are far more vulnerable to defaults.

Third, none of these loans are spliced, diced and sold off to other investors. Rather, these assets sit cleanly on the trusts’ balance sheet or in the banks’ WMP asset pool. Securitisation spread risk through the system in the US once a small number of securitised mortgage packages went bad. In contrast, in China, if a loan to a Shanxi mining company goes bad, the risk is contained – there is no infection through the system.

Fourth, there is little leverage. Trusts and WMPs generally raise funds from well-off folk and invest them. If there is a loss, either the investor (or the asset manager) takes the loss. If there are losses, there should be no deleveraging of portfolios triggered.

For these reasons, we think the best way of thinking about the risks of ‘shadow banking’ in China is that it will probably add to non-performing loans (NPL), but that it is unlikely to turn an NPL problem into a full-blown financial crisis, as critics allege.

Ultimately, though, the only thing which will slow the growth of this industry is rate liberalisation. At present, deposit rates are controlled. Once the People’s Bank of China allows rates to rise, banks can then compete for funds the usual way, rather than relying upon WMPs.

For the moment, then, WMPs are here to stay. While there may be risks involved, there is one big upside. This is rate liberalisation China-style. Households are getting paid a higher return on their savings. At the same time, the banks are learning to cope with paying more for their funds. This is happening gradually, not with the big bangs which have caused crises elsewhere. WMPs may actually reduce the risk of a banking sector crisis in China.

This article was co-authored by Dorris Chen, Head of China Financials Research and Stephen Green, Head of Research, Greater China.

金融体系的阴影中可能潜伏着危险的东西。我们之所以知道这一点,是因为当2008年美国银行业体系几乎被“烧毁”的时候,阴影中的东西就是助燃剂。这种充斥着证券化债务的高杠杆表外工具意味着,美国银行业危机要远比没有这些工具时严重。

因为知道了美国银行业体系曾潜伏的问题,一说到中国的影子银行业,人们就感到恐慌。在一个已经以容易出现资产泡沫和坏账而著称的经济里,影子银行业似乎增长得过快了。我们花了一些时间查探中国影子银行业的情况。我们相信,这种担忧很大程度上是没有必要的。

中国所谓的影子银行业与美国发生的事情没什么关系。广义上,影子银行业务是由非银行金融机构发放的信贷。在中国,影子银行业务最重要的载体就是理财产品理财产品由信托公司和银行销售。信托公司为富人和企业管理着大约10万亿元人民币(合1.6万亿美元),而银行理财产品的规模也不相上下(不过在信托公司管理的资产中,大约有3万亿元人民币是银行理财产品资金)。

影子银行业源于对监管的反应。随着《巴塞尔协议III》(Basel III)的出台,银行面临着更高的资本金要求,因此寻求发展表外业务。家庭也迫切希望将传统储蓄账户上的资金,转移到理财产品账户上,因为收益率会高出很多。对银行来说,绝大多数理财产品是受到管控的表外资产。

这里显然有一些问题。银行可通过表外持有理财产品,逃避某些重要的比率监管要求,比如无需对投资持有资本金。如果一款理财产品出现问题,理论上投资者要承担损失,但实际上银行通常不会让客户蒙受任何损失。

但普遍存在于人们想象中的风险有许多是缺乏根据的。此外,银行销售的理财产品和信托公司销售的理财产品有一些重要区别。

首先,查看一家典型银行的理财产品投资组合时,我们发现,大多数资金被用来购买短期的、流动性很强的银行间存款。结果是,理财产品平均收益率跟着银行间拆借利率走。因此,认为这些资金全都被用于中国一个个“鬼城”的房地产开发,是错误的。银行理财产品的资金只有20%-30%用于放贷。

相比之下,信托公司的资金几乎全部用于放贷,我们的研究发现,这些资金大部分被投向房地产和地方政府的基建公司。这里的信贷风险要大得多。

其次,当银行用理财产品的资金放贷时,借款人经历的信贷审批流程,通常与他们借入银行表内资金时是完全一样的。不同信托公司的信贷审批流程质量则有着很大差异。此外,银行有庞大的资产负债表,可以支撑任何损失,而信托公司的资本金比率则较低,因此应对违约冲击的能力要差得多。

第三,这些贷款都不会被分割、拼接、然后出售给其他投资者。相反,这些资产整整齐齐地待在信托公司的资产负债表上、或银行的理财产品资产池中。在美国,一旦一小部分证券化抵押贷款违约,证券化就会导致风险蔓延至整个体系。相比之下,在中国,如果一笔贷给一家山西煤炭公司的贷款违约,风险是可控的——它不会传染至整个体系。

第四,这些产品几乎没有什么杠杆。信托产品和银行理财产品通常从富人那里筹得资金,并用这些资金进行投资。如果发生亏损,投资者(或资产管理公司)会承担。即便发生亏损,应该也不会引发投资组合的去杠杆化。

出于上述原因,我们认为,最好这样看待中国“影子银行业”的风险:它可能会增加坏账,但它不太可能像批评人士所称的那样,会导致不良贷款问题演变为全面的金融危机。

然而,从根本上说,唯有利率自由化会减慢影子银行业的发展。就目前而言,存款利率受到管制。一旦中国人民银行(People’s Bank of China)允许存款利率上浮,银行就可以通过常规的方式(而不是依赖理财产品)来争抢资金了。

那么,就目前而言,理财产品将会继续存在。尽管其中可能蕴含风险,但有一个巨大的好处。这是中国式的利率自由化。家庭的存款获得了更高的收益。与此同时,银行正在学习应对更高的资金价格。这是一个渐进的过程,不会一蹴而就;而在其他地方,爆炸式演进曾导致危机。理财产品事实上可能降低了中国银行业爆发危机的风险。

本文由渣打银行(Standard Chartered)证券研究部中国金融行业研究主管陈睆明(Dorris Chen)和大中华区研究主管王志浩(Stephen Green)共同撰写

译者/邹策

本文关键字:财经英语,小艾英语,双语网站,财经双语,财经资讯,互联网新闻,ERWAS,行业解析,创业指导,营销策略,英语学习,可以双语阅读的网站!
  • 我的微信
  • 这是我的微信扫一扫
  • weinxin
  • 我的微信公众号
  • 我的微信公众号扫一扫
  • weinxin