【英语财经】不再耀眼的美国银行业 How the vampire squid became a flattened slug

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2016-4-25 21:33

小艾摘要: A decade ago, Goldman Sachs reported that its return on common shareholder equity had hit a dazzling 39.8 per cent. It symbolised a gilded age: back in 2006, as markets boomed, the power — and profit ...
How the vampire squid became a flattened slug
A decade ago, Goldman Sachs reported that its return on common shareholder equity had hit a dazzling 39.8 per cent. It symbolised a gilded age: back in 2006, as markets boomed, the power — and profits — of big banks seemed unstoppable.

How times change. This week, American banks unveiled downbeat results, with revenues for the biggest five tumbling 16 per cent year-on-year. But Goldman was even weaker: net income was 56 per cent lower, while return on equity, a key measure of profitability, was 6.4 per cent, below even the sector average in 2015 of 10.3 per cent.

A bank which was once so adept at sucking out profits that it was called a “vampire squid” (by Rolling Stone magazine) is thus producing returns more commonly associated with a utility. The phrase “flattened slug” might seem appropriate.

Is this just a temporary downturn? Financiers certainly hope so. After all, they point out, this week’s results did feature some upbeat (ish) points. None of America’s banks actually blew up in the first quarter of the year, even though markets gyrated in dramatic ways; the post-crisis reforms have improved risk controls and reserves.

Meanwhile, banking in America looks healthier than in Europe, where the reform process has been slower. Overall credit quality at American banks, outside the energy sector, does not seem alarming. Net interest margins are now increasing a touch, after several years of decline, because the Federal Reserve has raised rates.

The last quarter’s results might have been depressed by temporary geopolitical woes, such as business uncertainty about Brexit, the American elections, oil prices and the Chinese economy. Once this angst fades away later this year, returns may rebound; analysts expect the Goldman ROE, for example, to move towards 10 per cent later this year. “The market feels a little fragile,” says Harvey Schwartz, its chief financial officer. “[But] it feels like that is behind us.”

Perhaps. But even if this “optimism” is justified, nobody should ignore the cognitive shift. After all, a decade ago, an ROE of 10 per cent was considered a disaster, not a relief, at Goldman Sachs. So perhaps the most important lesson from this week is this: if American regulators had hoped to make the banks look truly dull — not dazzling — in this post-crisis era, they are now succeeding better than anyone might have thought.

It is not the first time this has occurred. In the 1920s, American finance also dazzled. Indeed, profits were so high that the economists Thomas Philippon and Ariell Reshef estimated that average banker pay was 1.6 times higher than other professions in 1928 (which, in a neat twist of history, was the same ratio seen in 2006.)

But when the 1929 crash happened, banks went bust and the financial sector subsequently became more utility-like: so much so that between 1940s and 1960s the banker pay ratio was nearer to 1.1. Tighter regulation was one reason for that. Another, less widely noticed, factor that cut bank profits was the fact that real interest rates in the US and UK were kept slightly negative in the postwar years, in a policy known as “financial repression”.

The pattern is not entirely identical this time around, since there is nowhere near the same state control over finance. But a regulatory squeeze is also under way, financial globalisation is in retreat and real interest rates are negative in some markets. And, unlike the 1950s, banks are also being disrupted by internet technology and the shadow banks. Pay is declining too: total compensation at Goldman Sachs is now 40 per cent lower than a year before, reflecting an industry trend.

Critics of Wall Street — such as Bernie Sanders, Hillary Clinton’s opponent in the Democratic primaries — will certainly not shed a tear about this. Nor will some shareholders, who argue that banks need to cut pay further if they are ever to boost their ROEs. And some regulators, such as Thomas Hoenig, vice-chairman of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, fear that the reform process is still incomplete, particularly given the continued power of the big banks. Indeed, as the economist Henry Kaufman points out, one irony of the post-crisis world is that big banks have become relatively bigger: the top ten players control 80 per cent of US assets.

Nevertheless, if financiers or angry politicians want to find thrills in finance today, they should look at asset managers, particularly the shadow banks. That is where some financiers are still reaping returns of 40 per cent. In today’s boring world, few want to shout about that; least of all if they used to work at Goldman Sachs.

10年前,高盛(Goldman Sachs)曾公布39.8%的耀眼净资产收益率(return on common shareholder equity)。那代表着一个镀金时代:在2006年,随着市场的繁荣,大银行的影响力(和利润)似乎无法阻挡。

时过境迁。最近,美国的银行公布了令人沮丧的财报:最大的五家银行的收入同比大减16%。但高盛的情况更糟:净利润暴跌56%,衡量盈利能力的关键指标股本回报率(ROE)为6.4%,甚至比2015年的行业平均水平(10.3%)还低。

一家曾如此擅长吸取利润、因而被(《滚石》杂志(Rolling Stone))冠以“吸血乌贼”(vampire squid)称号的银行,现在的回报率却更像是一家公用事业单位。“扁平鼻涕虫”这个称呼似乎适合现在的它。

这只是暂时的低迷吗?金融业人士肯定希望如此。毕竟,他们指出,今年第一季度的财报确实包含一些(微弱的)亮点。尽管今年第一季度市场大幅波动,但美国的银行没有一家真正出现大问题;后危机时代的改革已改善了风险控制和资本准备金。

与此同时,美国银行业看上去比欧洲更健康——欧洲的改革进程一直较为缓慢。美国各银行的总体信贷质量(除能源行业以外)看上去没什么问题。在经历了多年的下滑以后,净利差现在正在扩大,因为美联储(Fed)上调了利率。

上一季度的财报可能受到暂时的地缘政治问题的不利影响,例如业界对英国脱欧问题的不确定、美国大选、油价和中国经济。一旦这些担忧在今年晚些时候消散,回报率可能会反弹;例如,分析师预测,高盛的股本回报率将在今年晚些时候向10%攀升。“市场感觉有些脆弱,”高盛首席财务官哈维?施瓦茨(Harvey Schwartz)表示,“(但)这种情况似乎已经过去。”

或许如此吧。然而即便这种“乐观主义”有充分理由,我们也不应忽视这种认识上的变化。毕竟,在10年前的高盛,10%的股本回报率会被视为糟糕透顶,而非好消息。因此,或许上周带给我们的最重要教训是:如果美国监管机构曾经希望让银行在后危机时代变得业绩平平(而非耀眼)的话,那么他们现在已经比所有人可能想象到的更成功了。

这种情况并非首次发生。上世纪20年代,美国金融业也曾光芒耀眼。实际上,当时的银行利润非常高,据经济学家托马?菲利蓬(Thomas Philippon)和阿里埃勒?雷谢夫(Ariell Reshef)估计,1928年,银行家的平均工资是其他职业的1.6倍(历史真是曲折迂回,2006年也恰好是这个数字。)

然而,1929年的大崩盘后,银行纷纷破产,金融业后来变得更像是公用事业单位:最明显的是在上世纪40年代至60年代,银行家与其他职业的薪资比率接近1.1。更严格的监管是原因之一。另外一个不太显眼的压低银行利润的因素是,美国和英国的实际利率在战后那些年保持在略低于零的水平,这一政策被称为“金融抑制”(financial repression)。

这一次的情况并非完全一样,因为现在政府对金融的控制远不如从前。但监管同样在收紧,金融全球化在倒退,一些市场的实际利率为负。与上世纪50年代不同,银行还正在被互联网科技以及影子银行颠覆。银行业薪资也在下降:高盛现在的总薪酬比上一年下滑40%,这反映出一种行业趋势。

华尔街的批评者们(例如民主党初选中希拉里?克林顿(Hillary Clinton)的竞争对手伯尼?桑德斯(Bernie Sanders))肯定丝毫不会为之动容。一些股东也不会,他们认为,如果还想提高股本回报率,银行需要进一步降薪。一些监管者(例如联邦存款保险公司(Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation)副董事长托马斯?霍尼格(Thomas Hoenig))担心,改革进程仍未完成,尤其是考虑到大银行仍拥有影响力。实际上,正如经济学家亨利?考夫曼(Henry Kaufman)指出的那样,危机后世界荒谬的一点是大银行变得更大了:前10大银行控制着美国80%的资产。

然而,如果金融业人士或愤怒的政治人士希望在当今的金融业找到一些亮色的话,他们应该看看资产管理公司,尤其是影子银行。在这一领域,一些金融业人士仍在获得40%的回报率。在当今这个沉闷的世界,这件事几乎无人想要声张;尤其是如果他们曾经效力于高盛的话。

译者/梁艳裳

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